

Introduction

This book is addressed to advanced students of pragmatics, philosophy, and the philosophy of science. In its eight chapters I refer to the works of Plato, Aristotle, René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, Georg Friedrich Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, Jürgen Habermas and scores of modern philosophers and scholars in a variety of disciplines including pragmatics, linguistics, cognitive and affective science, cultural anthropology, psychology, sociology, hermeneutics, and others.

The common theme of the eight chapters is the epistemological relation between philosophy, science, and pragmatics in particular. The last one viewed as the science of the art of human communication, constitutes an indispensable base not only of all sciences but also of the possibility of existence of human society in its present forms.

From the semiotic point of view, human communication rests on the relations between signs and their users. This is a very vague and obscure assertion because it admits of many philosophical and scientific interpretations and in effect produces many frequently incompatible claims, hypotheses, and theories. In this book I discuss critically many of such philosophical and scientific controversies by referring to modern research in pragmatics and affective science including, *inter alia*, (1) the question of relations in pragmatics and its relevance to philosophy and others scientific disciplines; (2) the claims about the possibility of ‘universal pragmatics’ – especially, in the form proposed by Habermas; (3) the theory of Karl-Otto Apel’s ‘transcendental pragmatics’ and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics; (4) the issue of intersubjectivity in human communication; (5) the view of the Psychological Construction of Emotions from the perspective of Affective Pragmatics; (6) the project of explaining human action in terms of pragmatics; (7) the analysis of human communication in terms of action theory; and finally, (8) the critical approach to Willard van Orman Quine’s naturalized epistemology from the pragmatic perspective.

The projects in (6) and (7) focus on a critical analysis of modern theory of human action, which is based on rationalistic assumptions and claims including philosophical essentialism inherited from Aristotle and methodological reductionism used successfully in natural sciences. How-

ever, in the domain of human sciences, analysis involving such concepts as ‘essence’ and ‘reduction’ encounter many problems including the issue of incompleteness, simplification, or inadequacy both of the accepted methodology and the results of its application. A typical instance of an essentialist and reductionist methodology is that of modern action theory. According to its followers, human action can and should be analyzed in terms of only two mental constituents ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’. As a result of such assertions (1) affect and its constituents such as emotions, attitudes, mood; and (2) context, are claimed to be irrelevant to explaining human action. Both claims are unjustified from an observational and empirical point of view. In general, in its claims and methods, the methodological approach to human sciences promoted in this book is interdisciplinary, integrative and holistic rather than essentialist and reductionist.

The leading motives that appear in almost all chapters of this book show the unity of used methods, concepts, approaches, epistemological and ontological claims, argumentation and critique. They include such concepts as ‘relation’, ‘context’, ‘interaction’, ‘action’, ‘cause’, ‘reason’, ‘cognition’, ‘affect’, ‘emotion’, ‘intersubjectivity’, ‘communication’ and ‘pragmatics’. In this book I intend to show that pragmatic methods of argumentation and analysis of complex mental, social, cultural, and interactional phenomena and processes confirm their explanatory power. The methods may be applied not only to philosophical questions but also to scientific research. It should be noted, however, that pragmatics is an interdisciplinary science that has to account not only for strictly linguistic aspects of human communication but also for its mental, social, cultural, interactional, temporal-historical, physical, and bodily context. In effect, pragmatics has to become a multi-disciplinary science. Therefore, the pragmatic perspective applied in this book is capable of investigating a broad range of complex human phenomena and processes.

To be more specific, a brief summary of the eight chapters will follow. All of them concentrate on specific philosophical and methodological problems related to research in theoretical and occasionally empirical pragmatics.

Chapter 1, *The universal versus subjective aspects of relations in pragmatics*, focuses on the function of the concept of ‘relation’ in pragmatics, on its epistemological status, its varieties, and its occurrence as a basic philosophical category in the works of Aristotle, Kant, Charles S., Peirce, Bertrand Russell, and others. Pragmatics is a relational entity be-

cause it is constituted and justified in terms of relations between signs and their users. We live in the world of mental, social, cultural, physical, biological, interactional, and international relations. The traditional controversy between realists, conceptualists, and nominalists in regard to the status of relations continues. This chapter presents basic assumptions and claims about causal relations in pragmatics. Additionally, it considers the notion of context as a relational category and presents a causal construction of meaning in communicative interaction. The latter may be considered as a candidate for a universal status. Likewise, other types of proposed relations such as co-being, supersession, uni- and bi-directionality, multi-contextuality and the cognitive-affective-conative relational system may be considered as universal for humankind. Another important question raised in this chapter refers to the dynamic causal relations between the internal and external context. Finally, this chapter offers a distinction between two pragmatic systems, namely, that of Pragmatic Relational System and Pragmatic Reference System. Thus, proposed pragmatic universals belong to the formal rather substantive type. Along with universal also subjective relations appear in social interaction.

In Chapter 2, *On the idea of universal pragmatics*, I consider the possibility of ‘universal pragmatics’ in the form proposed by Jürgen Habermas. This chapter offers a historical background related to the question of universals followed by an extensive analysis of the merits and problems with Habermas’s approach to that issue. The latter is based on such notions as communicative action, rationality, and validity. The question of ‘rationality’ has been considered as problematic and its universal status questioned. According to Habermas, rationality on which rests his theory of society should be considered as a universal decontextualized idea or isolated module. Evidently, his view of rationality is that of idealistic rationalism and certainly as such it is not a concept related to pragmatics. Other issues discussed in this chapter include Habermas’s view of the concept of understanding, intersubjectivity and the role argumentation in communicative action. I conclude the discussion with the claim that Habermas’s universals may be easily questioned by means of empirical evidence.

Chapter 3, *Transcendental pragmatics and hermeneutics*, includes the critical analysis of transcendentalism from Immanuel Kant to Karl-Otto Apel’s theory of transcendental pragmatics, and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s view of hermeneutics as a science of interpreting texts. Philosophical transcendentalism is essentialist in its method – synthetic *a priori*. It aims

at universal categories – *a priori* knowledge. The problems with transcendental argumentation have been discussed and criticized. The Kantian form of transcendentalism based on deduction has been contrasted with transcendentalism based on abduction and induction. The latter form of transcendence is closely related to the methods of empirical science. Apel's view of transcendentalism is modified by a variety of ideas related to pragmatics; especially, these offered by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Charles S. Peirce, Charles Morris and John Austin. As a result, Apel performed a 'pragmatic turn' in the domain of transcendentalism and elevated pragmatic analysis to the position of a first philosophy. Certainly, Apel's contribution is a considerable step in the right direction, however, it is not fully satisfactory because a number of problems in his theory require reconsideration and reanalysis. They include the question of anti-relativism and anti-fallibilism, universalism and transcendentalism. Finally, Gadamer's view of (1) understanding texts in terms of a 'fusion of horizons' and (2) overcoming subjectivity is critically evaluated.

Chapter 4, *On intersubjectivity in science, philosophy and pragmatics* presents the status of the concept of intersubjectivity in different domains of both theoretical and empirical investigation. Science focuses, first of all, on the status of intersubjectivity in infants, that is, the question of its inborn or acquired nature. Philosophical analyses of intersubjectivity including these of Edmund Husserl, Martin Buber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, George Herbert Mead, Alfred Schütz, and Jürgen Habermas explain and justify the concept in relation to their larger aims and scientific projects as well as interests oriented either towards psychological and phenomenological investigations or social studies. The pragmatic perspective of the present author is focused on analyzing the empirical status of intersubjectivity in communicative interaction. This perspective allows an identification of the theoretical and practical problems associated with idealizing and universalizing approaches to the operation of intersubjectivity. Especially, the questions of why and when intersubjectivity does not work and what are the reasons of such events, are evidently neglected by the standard, non-pragmatic or weakly-pragmatic approaches to that problem.

Chapter 5, *Affective pragmatics and the psychological construction of emotion* shows some theoretical merits as well as weaknesses of the psychological construction of emotions from the perspective of affective pragmatics. It also proposes some indispensable improvement of the model under consideration. The philosophical background of these con-

siderations is presented as a clash between philosophical cognitivism versus affectivism reconstructed by the author of this book as two rival traditions in accounts of emotions. The question of human emotions has been taken up by eminent philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume Kant, and Nietzsche. Modern investigations into emotions continue the philosophical traditions. I take a critical view of the exclusively cognitive accounts of emotions. In general, the epistemological attitude promoted in this book is that of putting into question the approaches I refer to as ‘one factor metaphysics’, that is, instances of radical reductionism, which leads to explanatory failure.

In Chapter 6, *Relating affect and context to action: A theoretical grounding* I will argue in favor of a multi-dimensional, contextual, and integrative view of human action and against the currently dominating reductionist view. The latter is based on cognitive, affect-free analyses of actions in terms of two principal constituents: beliefs and desires. It will be claimed that different forms of affect underlie and explain actions, beliefs, and desires. Therefore, first the basic conceptual, taxonomic, and methodological weaknesses of the investigations on human action will be pointed out. Second, the formative and explanatory role of (a) affect (including attitudes, feelings, moods and emotions) and (b) context in human actions, will be discussed. The significant philosophical questions that appear in this chapter include, inter alia, the following: (1) the emotion-cognition interface, (2) the causes vs. reasons debate, (3) the reductionist vs. holistic methodology, (4) the essentialist method, (5) the taxonomic issues related to actions, beliefs, and emotions, and (6) the forms of cognition.

Chapter 7, *Human communication as action: An inquiry into the explanatory power of pragmatics* attempts to show how linguistic pragmatics can contribute to the analysis and explanation of human action. It will be argued that (1) the current view of human action analyzed in terms of two constituents – ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ is too narrow to account adequately for human communicative interaction, and (2) the claim that reasons are causes of actions need to be reconsidered. Consequently, the idea of Explanatory Pragmatics (EP) – a multilevel, contextual and constructionist approach to human communicative (inter)-action is proposed. The Explanatory Pragmatics is based on interrelated explanatory categories such as causes and effects, reasons and actions, explanation, understanding, and context. The basic theoretical assumptions of this inquiry include a focus on a holistic account of communicative interaction, a non-

essentialist and non-reductionist methodology, and a contextualization of human action. The proposed approach goes beyond the traditional Speech Act Theory by giving general top to bottom explanations in terms of such new concepts as Motivation System (MS), Action System (AS), Meaning Projections (MP), Meaning Interpretation (MI), Meaning Understanding (MU), and some others.

Chapter 8, *Naturalized epistemology and modern pragmatics* The primary goal of this chapter is to consider philosophical and pragmatic investigations on language, science and epistemology, and the possible interrelations between them. Specifically, some aspects of the philosophy of Willard van Orman Quine's are analyzed in the light of current research in modern pragmatics. The most important of them are the following: (1) the indeterminacy of translation, (2) the inscrutability of reference, (3) the ontological relativity, (4) the underdetermination of theory, (5) the revisibility or holism thesis, (6) the rejection of intensional objects, including meanings, propositions, attributes, and relations, (7) the rejection of synonymy and of analytic-synthetic relation as well as of the epistemological reductionism. We suggest that a more comprehensive framework of 'pragmatic epistemology', and ratio-empirical method such as that recommended in the non-Cartesian view of pragmatics offers better descriptive and explanatory ideas to give an explanation for the complex linguistic and philosophical issues which can hardly be accounted for in the framework of Quine's naturalized epistemology.